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Introduction 
This chapter will explore the question of how the European far-right, the heir of a backward-looking ideological tradition, has managed to survive for a period straddling three centuries, currently forming a permanent fixture of European politics. This persistence is all the more impressive if one considers the twin but conflicting imperatives the far-right has struggled with in its historical trajectory: the imperative to maintain a profile of opposition to secular social and political progress – what I will call the reaction imperative; and the imperative to keep a parochial critique relevant by engaging with the constant evolution of the dominant ideas attached to political and economic rule – what I will call the modernisation imperative. These conflicting imperatives normally should have hindered the development and survival of the far-right, but its persistence suggests that it has juggled them with success. What has made this success possible? Following the focus of this volume, I will treat this question by emphasizing two aspects in the study of the far-right: First, as is the case with most contributions here, I will employ a longue durée historical perspective of the far-right’s evolution. Second, I will focus on the role of the ‘international as constitutive of the identity and orientation of the far right’ at various points in time, particularly because I share with the contributors of this volume the idea that the international forms an important asset of the far-right, being framed invariably as ‘fear, hostility and opportunity’ (see Introduction to this volume, also Saull (2013: 2)). 
One can probe the question of this chapter by seeing the two imperatives as expressions of the far-right’s engagement with the modern sovereign state. The reaction imperative concerns the far-right’s need to maintain the profile of principled opposition to progressive or liberal aspects of political, economic and social modernisation, stemming from its initial historical unease with the modern organisation of the political within a territorial unit based on democratic norms of popular sovereignty. The modernisation imperative concerns the need of the far-right to make the best of its embedding within this inescapable structure by formulating alternative visions of modernity. Yet, by seeing the far-right’s historical adaptation and evolution as a process of engagement with the modern state, one also has to take into account the fact that each state is in turn embedded in overarching global and regional geopolitical constellations, as well as that the national arenas within which the far-right competes have significant points of opening with their environment. Thus, in order to engage with the reality of the state and to shape domestic politics in its favour, the far-right has always had to adapt and instrumentalise features of international politics.
	An adaptation to changing features of the international system and of geopolitical order can take two forms: A new international systemic constellation includes new directions of conflict that the far-right can translate into domestic politics in a radicalised form in order to satisfy the reaction imperative; and it includes norms defining conceptions as to the role and capabilities of the state which the far-right can engage with (by opposing or embracing) in order to satisfy the modernisation imperative. By seeing the international as the field where the internal contradiction of the far-right is resolved, one can construct a narrative about its longue durée that accounts for the radically varying political, economic and social outlook of far-right reaction over 200 years – from corporatism to Cold War neoliberalism, and from elitist authoritarianism to majoritarian populism. These varying preferences can be understood as transmission mechanisms that absorb new international constellations into domestic politics and shape party competition according to the far-right’s need for survival and relevance. 




The International Structuring of Domestic Politics: The Far-right Between the Domestic and the International
The ontological and practical differentiation between the domestic and the international spheres was the starting assumption of research in International Relations, be it of realists who advocated that international system-level interactions had a logic of their own beyond developments inside states (Waltz, 1959), or of liberals who, while focusing on the importance of domestic preferences for world politics, still saw what was happening inside each sphere as analytically separate (Moravcsik, 1997). This analytical separation has been extensively critiqued in the last 20 years by a literature of a social constructivist bent. Constructivism has supported that the common character of international and domestic structures as social and ideational forces us to drop the analytical differentiation between levels of analysis (Wendt, 1999). Instead, in the social world neither the domestic nor the international level take precedence; rather, the main distinction must be between actors who are constituted by rules and norms of social interaction, and material-ideational social structures, which in turn are affected by the activity of these agents (Dessler, 1989). From this it flows that international arrangements such as the expansion of the organisational form of the nation-state have their roots in local politics (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1995), and that domestic political identities have corresponding international referents that create consistent sets of domestic-international policy preferences (Hopf, 2002). 
	According to social constructivism, we can think of domestic and international arenas of politics (party systems and the international system respectively) as linked structures reproducing patterns of interaction among their units (political parties and states respectively), norms that regulate this interaction, and commonly shared understandings as to what the stakes of this interaction are, i.e. a ‘language of politics’ (Mair, 1997: 13). In this view, politics is united across levels: ‘If one understands both the international system and the state in terms of normatively constituted practices, international and domestic politics are not hermetically sealed within their own spheres. [P]olitical practice is divided into these two realms only by the historical fact of the state as the institutional setup that organizes politics […]’ (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1995: 135). 
	The international system contains and reproduces ideas and understandings with two functions: First, they make up a language of international politics that gives meaning to variations of power, size and other material attributes (Buzan, 2007[1991]: 140). Second, they determine who the acceptable players are and what their features must be. Since the late-18th century, the nation-state progressively imposed itself as the dominant unit of the international system. As the constitutive unit within which modern politics plays out, the state includes not only external (sovereignty) but also internal normative attributes: among them, the people as the source of legitimacy and subjects as citizens (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1995: 135-137). However, these normative attributes are never stable, as different constellations of ideas and material power bring about redefinitions of their exact meaning (Philpott, 2001).
	Following the constructivist logic of cross-level unity of social structures, we can see national party systems as distinct outcomes of the interaction between domestic and international processes. Caramani (2004) has shown that the shape of each national party system owes a lot to path-dependent processes that, through wars and change of borders, demarcated arenas within which ‘domestic politics’ play out. Next to the constraints imposed by state-level political and institutional features, parties and politicians are also impacted by the dual function of the international system in reproducing patterns of international interaction and conflict, and dominant understandings as to what the accepted form and capabilities of its constitutive units (the states) are. These international systemic features embed competition across different national arenas, but the way they impact on domestic structures hinges critically on the political agency of partisan actors. 
	Based on the above, beyond a core of beliefs, ideas and traditions that characterise the far-right as a transnational ideological family, far-right parties are constituted differently from national arena to national arena. Not only is the precise content of ‘reaction’ different (Minkenberg, 2001), but even the very notion of ‘extremity’ changes according to where the normative epicentre of a regime lays (Capoccia, 2002). This means that the opportunities and capabilities of the far-right differ from state to state. Second, far-right parties are constituted by the dual impact of the international system on domestic politics. Just like other parties, they have the opportunity to respond and absorb international lines of conflict as stakes of domestic party competition according to their political needs; and to deal with constantly evolving ideas as to the character and nature of the unit within which they function, the state.
	The far-right’s ideology and structural position of extremity in national party systems is a derivative of its interaction with both layers that constitute party politics. The far-right’s reaction historically concerns its unease with the democratic state as a political arena of secular politics, ranging (depending on the point in time and the degree of extremity of each far-right movement) from outright rejection of mass politics to an opposition to the liberal elements of democracy in favour of plebiscitarian and majoritarian institutions (see Saull’s chapter in this volume). The far-right’s basic self-positioning of extremity is informed by its lacklustre attitude towards the modernisation of the unit of international politics, expressed in the impulsive opposition towards norms of social and political modernisation constantly arising and redefining the meaning of sovereignty (from popular-democratic sovereignty in the nineteenth century to the state’s obligation to protect its citizens’ human security today) and in the selective embrace of aspects of modernity (such as war-making technology). It means that the far-right can be expected to oppose most processes of further secular modernisation of the state while contingently embracing some responding to the modernisation imperative. Consequently, the far-right is also predisposed to absorb international dimensions of competition into radical and uncompromising foreign policy positions. 
	From the above it becomes evident that the far-right has, from its inception, faced an internal contradiction (see the Introduction of this volume): while it impulsively rejects most aspects of modernisation, it was under the modern condition that the far-right came into being, further modernisation provided it with opportunities for its growth, and its critique acquires meaning through its adaptation to on-going dominant conceptions of modernity and its domestic and international expressions. The far-right’s split attitude towards the modern state is resolved through creative engagement with the norms and structures within which the state itself is embedded. In new dimensions of international competition, far-right parties see an opportunity to redefine the stakes of domestic competition and underpin their extreme self-placement. In new norms and practices of sovereignty and the nature of the nation-state, far-right parties see updates of modernity, selective opposition or engagement with which redefines their own outlook and provides them with alternative reactionary narratives of domestic rule. In this way, the far-right ‘modernises’ itself, in tune with the evolution of the character of the state, while maintaining its outside appearance as a reliable source of reaction to expressions of political, social and institutional modernisation. 
	The state is not only constituted by the international system it operates in, but also constitutes the content and shape of partisan competition within its confines. Blyth and Katz (2005) have shown how the changing regulatory and policymaking capacities of the state throughout the twentieth century crucially provided incentives and pressures for the relationship between society and party systems to change, as well as for party competition and policy distance between parties to evolve. According to this analysis, as party actors adapt to various international pressures and new arrangements in international and domestic political economy, they also shape the institutions and content of party competition in order to remain relevant and entrench their position of strength. Blyth and Katz were making an argument about the creation of electoral cartels by mainstream parties, however there is no reason to deny that the far-right also uses developments in international politics to overcome its internal contradiction and to embed gains in new directions and features of national party systems. 
	The role of the far-right in the transformation of national party systems has been explored, most prominently, by Kriesi et al (2006). In their view, radical right parties absorb globalisation as a stake of domestic competition by energising a cleavage between modernisation winners and losers – what they call the ‘demarcation/integration conflict’ (Kriesi et al, 2006: 922). This in turn infuses party competition with new meanings. Their conceptualisation of political space sees party competition in Western Europe as being structured along a socioeconomic left-right axis and a cultural axis. Under the influence of populist far-right parties, the meaning of the cultural axis changed after the end of the Cold War to include questions of economic and cultural sovereignty against the pervasive forces of globalisation. Kriesi et al demonstrate, by means of longitudinal mapping of political space in six West European democracies, that the redefinition of the meaning of the cultural axis by far-right parties forces all other parties to adjust their positions, thus leading to redefined dimensions of competition and a new discursive framework within which party competition takes place. 
	Kriesi et al show that the change in the meaning of the cultural axis of competition takes place due to it absorbing the globalisation loser vs. winner conflict. This is a different way of saying that the far-right contests the meanings and capacities attached to the state under conditions of pervasive denationalisation of policy processes, in essence translating an international line of conflict (state sovereignty vs. international economic and cultural integration) into a dimension of domestic conflict. This has been the case, according to Kriesi et al, both for countries with active and successful far right parties in the past 20 years like France, Austria and Switzerland, and for countries where established parties pre-empted the rise of the far-right by adapting their agendas to this international line of conflict, for example on immigration (as in Germany). Realignment of domestic party systems around this new conflict allows the far-right to overcome its internal contradiction, since it manages to combine its function of reaction with (at least the semblance of) an alternative vision of the state in a globalised world. Significantly altered features of a party system can also be attributed (at least in part) to conscious adaptation strategies of the far-right as it recalibrates its relationship with the modern state under conditions of international change. 
	In sum, the adaptation of the far-right to international politics in the longue durée has not been a simple matter of programmatic evolution, but rather a deeply embedded process whereby far-right actors become constituted by the changing qualities of the state within evolving geopolitical and economic constellations. It is these changing qualities of the state that provide the reference point for the far-right’s critique and its formulation of reactionary but pertinent visions of political order. In this context, one must for example pay much more attention to the foreign policy positions far-right parties have espoused. This may be a counterintuitive proposition: after all, rarely are far right parties thought of as parties laying emphasis on foreign policy (see Introduction of this volume). Yet foreign policy positions codify ‘visions of domestic society’ (Manow et al, 2008: 25). International systemic changes create windows of opportunity to absorb new lines of international conflict and new norms into domestic debate and translate them as new stakes of domestic competition according to a party’s political needs​[1]​. 
	Of course foreign policy is not the only adaptation mechanism of the far-right. The far-right contests the state’s role and character in new international constellations also on issues with transnational dimensions. Kriesi et al for example see the far-right turning globalisation into a domestic issue through their discourse on immigration that mobilises ‘losers’ against ‘winners’. However immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon in the programmatic arsenal of the far-right. While it presents continuities with the far-right’s ethnic nationalism of the late nineteenth century, a focus on immigration would conceal the continuous importance of e.g. the economic dimensions in the far-right’s mobilisation discourse in the last 200 years, which in turn reveals the underpinnings of a thread in the attitudes of the far-right running from the discourse of external expansion in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century to the discourse of internal separation (‘welfare nationalism’) of the last 30 years (see Introduction).   Indeed, the state’s prerogatives and normative attributes are significantly intertwined with its capacities in the economic field and with its embedding in global networks of capitalist development. The way the far-right engages with the modern state’s role in the world economy has historically formed a significant part of its adaptation strategy to international developments, and next to its foreign policy positions and cultural outlook constitutes an important tool for overcoming the tension between the imperatives of reaction and modernisation. 

The Longue Durée of the Far-Right and International Politics 
a) The Far-right from its Inception to World War II
If seen as part of a reactionary tradition opposing broad democratic values and social modernization, the far-right can be seen to have its origins in the clerical, royalist and aristocratic elements mobilizing in favour of the privileges of the ancien régime. However, as a force of modern mass politics, the far-right (or what Weiss (1977) calls ‘New Right’, to differentiate it from the aristocratic and elitist ‘Old Right’) may be considered to have arisen in the turbulent period of mid-nineteenth century revolutionary upheaval, a period that marked the transition to mass democratic politics as the point of reference of political life and the ushering in of uneven capitalist development across Europe as the dominant economic condition (see Saull’s chapter that locates the point of emergence of the modern far-right after the revolutions of 1848). The divide between the outlooks of the old ancien régime right and the new mass far-right is best established in the issue of nationalism: While the elitist Old Right opposed it as expression of democratic and revolutionary politics, the far-right eventually came to embrace it, thus allowing the reactionary tradition to adapt to the era of mass politics. However, the main continuity between the two concerned an authoritarian culture of reaction to progress and modernisation of other norms and practices (Hobsbawm, 1975, 1995; Weiss, 1977). 
	The evolution of the basic unit of politics offered an opportunity to recast reactionary agendas in modernised terms. Given the modern state’s dual nature as both an arena of domestic politics and a point of differentiation from the other units of the international system, the far-right found in foreign policy an area where its double strategy could play itself out vividly. Bismarck’s foreign policy can be seen as an extension of the imperative to maintain the prerogatives of the Prussian ruling class: while it espoused (and indeed radicalised) the demands of modern nationalism (by promoting German unification and imperialism), and under pressure from a rising and politically increasingly assertive working class, this foreign policy integrated traditional agrarian, bureaucratic and military elites by making them guardians of a new industrialised nation-state, embedded in a nationalist (and eventually imperialist) shroud. Two decades later, the Dreyfus affair allowed the French right to appropriate nationalism from the left (Weiss, 1977). 
	The far-right’s controversial relationship with the modern state from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of World War II becomes starkly evident in its foreign policies. Interactions in the international system reproduced understandings about the accepted character and capabilities of the state with which the far-right engaged, by instrumentally employing a modernist discourse or by radically opposing the democratic state as an expression of modernity as such. Between 1870 and 1945 an international system characterised by Realpolitik, elite diplomacy and conflicting imperialisms (Kennedy, 1980), served as a resource for the far-right to radicalise its position in domestic politics by propagating an aggressive nationalism. The prevalence of the nation-state as the dominant organisational form of politics provided a reference point for the updating of the far-right’s message – be it as subversion of the Third Republic in France or the Weimar Republic in Germany, or as appropriation of modernist goals like economic development and national integration by pre-modern elites in Wilhelmian Germany. 
	The activities of far right politicians allowed various movements to benefit from different international constellations. Particularly conducive for the far-right was the infusion from the late nineteenth century onwards of nationalism with imperialist and expansionist endeavours, including colonialism outside of Europe and revanchism and intensification of nationalist competition in Europe. The far-right also was particularly active in straddling modern and pre-modern conceptions of the community depending on the environment it was functioning in. We already mentioned how the German far-right appropriated modernist themes as a way to maintain the prerogatives of pre-modern elites. The opposite process took place in Austria, where a German-speaking far-right (whose prominent figures included Karl Lueger, mayor of Vienna for almost fifteen years in the end of nineteenth century and outspoken anti-Semite) sought to radicalise ethnic relations in an imperial framework still very reminiscent of the ancien régime (Weiss, 1977: 118-125). 
	After German unification the far-right in Germany embraced mass politics and mobilisation through the cause of military and colonial expansion, while the Austrian far-right reproduced inside the Austrian empire the latter’s agonising foreign policy dilemmas towards surrounding German and Slav nationalisms, a constellation that would eventually drag (by way of the Balkans) the whole continent into World War I. Far right activism in turn undertook to employ imperialism as a force of domestic realignment in accordance with its own values and the interests of specific elites, such as the coalition of big landowners and industrialists in imperial Germany around protectionism and imperialism (‘iron and rye’) (Schonhardt-Bailey, 1998). The ethnic and conservative values of colonial expansion were a potent argument in the French far-right’s incessant effort to undermine the Third Republic’s institutions, while (in an opposite direction) they served as a safety valve that the far-right employed (through organisations like the Alldeutscher Verband – Pan-German League) to defuse social pressures towards the German imperial regime (Saull, 2013: 8). The far-right was very acute across different domestic-international constellations in combining the modern imperatives of mobilisation and participation with its own reactionary ideological preferences.
	With ultra-nationalism and anti-socialism the far-right embraced part of mass politics. However, the self-perception of the far-right as a force of reaction clashed with the ever-present need for this same political force to modernise itself. This internal contradiction during 1870-1945 was revealed most starkly in the question of nationalism. While ethnic and racist nationalism allowed the far-right to update the reactionary tradition’s aversion towards democracy and civic conceptions of politics, it also exposed it to a terrible dilemma in cases when the imperative of extremist opposition to civic institutions clashed with the key imperative of nationalism, the support of the nation-state. Coming back to the examples of Germany and France, both projects collapsed when the inherent contradiction between support for a modernist project (the nation-state) and the ideological baggage of authoritarian and non-civic ideas became evident: The need to galvanise the imperial order, which was under severe pressure from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and demands for democratisation, informed the reckless adventurism that led the Reich into World War I. This adventurism was taken to new paranoid extremes by the Nazis in World War II, while the French far-right’s decision to trade national dignity for ideological purity in Vichy completely delegitimised it. 

b) Sheltered behind the Wall: The Far-right during the Cold War
World War II did not only delegitimise the far-right as the bearer of an authoritarian and aggressive ideology, but completely stripped it of any pretence it had as a force of honest patriotism or nationalism. Its reinvention as a nationalistic force capable of adapting to the ways of triumphant liberalism seemed almost impossible. However, the far-right found in the bipolar confrontation between capitalism and communism a first leeway for its own rejuvenation. The norms governing inter-state interactions under the Cold War offered a valuable framework for the tempering of the internal contradiction that had almost completely destroyed the far-right. The Cold War structure reproduced a peculiar combination of internationalism and demarcation (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1995: 134): demarcation between the two blocs, and internationalism and openness between members of each bloc, as, especially in the West, a thick web of international institutions and a gradual hollowing of political and economic sovereignty took place. However, this hollowing was mitigated in the economic field by the development of significant domestic compensation mechanisms like generous welfare states that maintained some basic lines of demarcation between Western states (Ruggie, 1982; Saull, 2013: 13).   
	It was this dual, and partly conflicting, nature of pressures applied on the state at the time that provided opportunities for the far-right. A pronounced position on the demarcation between the two camps (i.e. strong anti-communism) allowed it to update its reactionary ideological baggage, and an advanced pro-Western stance (which usually included wholehearted espousal of pro-American dictatorships in the periphery of Europe and the global South) allowed it to dissociate its critique of political and economic modernity from suspicions of undermining democracy in Western Europe. The gambit was discernible in the activities of some early exponents of the post-War far-right. One such example was the 1965 presidential campaign in France of Tixier-Vignancour who struck an unapologetically pro-American tone, accusing De Gaulle of weakening both France and the Western alliance in the face of Communism and Third World nationalism. In this way, the critique against a democratic regime drew on a pro-Western alliance discourse and absorbed the internationalism of the Cold War as opposition to what was presented as a protectionist, authoritarian and dangerously isolated regime (Shields, 2007: 126-131). 
	The rise of the new populist and radical right in the 1980s roughly followed the same patterns. By that time the internationalism of the Western camp had deepened even more (particularly in Europe through the institutional strengthening of the EEC), while the division of Europe seemed, after the acceptance of détente by both blocs, more or less carved in stone. Yet this was also the time when the post-War economic boom had reached the point of exhaustion, opening up opportunities for the challenging of political and economic elites that had supported the welfare state up to that point. This in turn fuelled a fundamental ideological critique of domestic regimes by new populist parties along neoliberal lines. Indeed, neoliberalism allowed these parties to integrate both the internationalism and the demarcation of the Cold War by polarizing party competition against the left, while embedding their undermining of democratic orders within a critique of exhausted welfare systems and of the fragmentation of the Western camp because of national compensation mechanisms. 
	The most successful exponent of this new populist right, Le Pen’s Front National in France, functioned within national and international contexts that were harnessed by a radicalisation of both the demarcation and the internationalism aspect of the Cold War constellation. Since De Gaulle, France occupied an uncertain position within the Western alliance, staying outside of NATO and grudgingly contributing to the process of European integration (Evans, 2007: 126-127). The FN made its mark by accusing all established parties of weakening France and making it vulnerable to Communist aggression (Evans, 2007: 134; Shields, 2007: 215-216), and to Islamist infiltration, thus making a link with the domestic issue of immigration (Shields, 2007: 206-208). Next to a radicalisation of the Cold War confrontation, the FN found in the internationalism of the Western camp a pillar for its fundamentalist critique against the structures of the Fifth Republic (Shields, 2007: 127). By attaching itself to the tenets of the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal ‘revolution’ of the time (Bornschier, 2011: 98), the FN managed to embed its criticism of the regime within a more respectable shroud (Evans, 2007: 131-132). As we will see, the Austrian far-right also followed the same strategy with great success.
	In sum, demarcation and internationalism of the Cold War system provided resources for the far-right to embed its reaction within a relevant critique of the states it was operating in. What Herbert Kitschelt (1995) described as the ‘winning formula’ of the ‘new radical right’ in the 1980s (cultural authoritarianism and economic neoliberalism) cannot really be separated from the peculiar challenges the far-right has historically faced and from the opportunities the Cold War provided for it to overcome its internal tension between the reaction and the modernisation imperatives. Apart from responding to the crisis of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberal economics in the policies of major capitalist states after the 1970s, the far-right’s Cold War attachment to free economics (which predated Thatcher and Reagan) also served as the conduit for the transmission of demarcation (between West and East, also exacerbated by the rhetoric of conservative governments in the United States and Great Britain in the 1980s) and Western internationalism into the political systems of states in different geopolitical positions (e.g. France was part of the ‘West’, while Austria, as we will see, was a neutral state). It was indeed critical to allow the far-right to brand democratic regimes and welfare states as ‘rigid’ and ‘socialist’ (criticizing the demarcation between national economic jurisdictions within the West), and to absorb Cold War dynamics in a way that served its strategic goals (especially by increasing right-left polarisation in national party systems). While the winning formula seems today like a rational strategy in light of the welfare state’s woes in the 1980s, the picture becomes more complete if one also accounts for the historical roots of the far-right in anti-democratic traditions and for capitalism’s rooting in geopolitical constellations. This would also be a more complete explanation for why neoliberalism was employed by a party family that historically had been much more identified (at least in terms of programmatic proclamations) with corporatism. 

From Radical Atlanticism to Protectionist Nationalism: The Far-Right in the Post-Cold War Era Through the Case Study of the FPÖ
The collapse of the Soviet empire signalled the emergence, and to a certain extent imposition, of new norms about the role of the state, with increasing pressures towards denationalisation of public policies and a hollowing of sovereignty on a global scale. While the international system lost its clear-cut line of conflict (as the West-East polarisation was replaced by a fluid opposition between demarcation and internationalism as such), the reference point of what constitutes ‘modern’ clearly evolved: ‘[Postmodern states] still retain the trappings of modernity such as borders, sovereignty and national identity [but] Postmodern states have a much more open and tolerant attitude towards cultural, economic, and political interaction, and have by and large convinced themselves that opening their economies, and to a lesser extent their societies and politics, to a wider range of interactions is good both for their prosperity and for their security’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 22-23). 
	For far-right parties, the upsetting of the Cold War balance between internationalism and demarcation figured to be very consequential. The fall of Communism deprived them of one of the important targets of their polarising discourse (Mayer, 2002: 29). The triumph of one of the two opponents of the Cold War made neoliberal internationalism the dominant normative paradigm and turned national demarcation archaic. This establishment of postmodern international governance made Western internationalism obsolete as an element of domestic reaction for the far-right, while it threatened to delegitimise its own espousal of demarcation (e.g. opposition to immigration). Eventually, the far-right settled into striking a new balance between the reaction imperative (by calling into question the denationalisation of public policy and by slowly embracing readings of international politics that were radically opposed to mainstream political, security and economic global governance) and the modernisation imperative (by shifting from a Cold War internationalism to a post-Cold War protectionist nationalism as the basis of alternative visions of domestic rule). Anti-Americanism, hard Euroscepticism and cultural and economic protectionism became the staple of far-right parties in Western Europe, eventually leading to a rigid espousal of classical modernity and readings of sovereignty as expressions of opposition to the evolution of the character of the state. However, as we shall see, this process was highly dependent on the domestic and international contexts each far-right party was operating in. 
	I will demonstrate the trajectory of the far-right since the end of the Cold War by analysing closely the way the Austrian FPÖ’s outlook evolved. I am focusing on the FPÖ for various reasons. First is the fact that the Austrian far-right is, next to the French one, the one with the longest and deepest uninterrupted history of relevance since the revolutionary period. These are the two members of the far-right family that offer the best opportunities to assess its adaptation mechanisms across the longue durée. However, secondly, the Front National dominates analysis, to the extent that the argument made in this article may be better portrayed through a fresh perspective and a focus on a different country. 
	Third, and related, the FPÖ is interesting in ways that highlight important qualifying conditions of the argument here. The FN’s course away from neoliberalism and towards a discourse mobilizing ‘globalisation losers’ followed a very meaningful break of the party with pro-Western foreign policy already during the first Gulf War (Birenbaum, 1992). Since then, the FN has followed a linear course towards more economic protectionism and more nationalism. However, as we will see, the geopolitical context was different for France than for Austria. It was this difference in the opportunities provided by the international context that made the FPÖ follow a much more roundabout course in its engagement with the main lines of international conflict. 
	Fourth, Austria is interesting for demonstrative purposes because it offers a very visible marker of change of the party system’s character, namely different patterns of coalition between parties. The FPÖ’s political agency aimed precisely at absorbing international lines of conflict in a way that would realign coalition making in Austria. As mentioned above, realignments of domestic politics like these signal the far-right’s success in overcoming its internal tension by making the character of the state it operates in a stake of political competition.
	During the Cold War the Austrian party system was characterised by the cooperation between the Christian Democrat ÖVP and the Social Democrat SPÖ. The system of cooperative management of the Austrian state and economy was dubbed Proporz, and it reflected the decision of the elites of both parties to maintain peace after the traumatic experiences of the interwar period. Staying outside of the Proporz arrangement were nationalist, liberal and authoritarian forces, eventually unified under the banner of the FPÖ. The FPÖ opposed the corporatist political and economic arrangements of Proporz through an emphasis on liberal economics (Virchow, 2007: 57). This constellation of the Austrian party system, whereby cooperation between ÖVP and SPÖ reduced polarisation and FPÖ’s opposition to Proporz energised a regime cleavage, was closely linked with Austria’s place in the Cold War context. Following the successful negotiation of the withdrawal of foreign troops in 1955, Austria accepted a status of international non-alignment in exchange for a free development of its social system (Schultz, 1992: 174; Virchow, 2007: 55). Neutrality became an essential part of Austria’s self-conception, as the two parties of Proporz underlined the consensus of Austrian democracy with a commitment to neutrality (Schultz, 1992: 173-175). 
	The SPÖ defended neutrality at all costs and became identified with Austria’s active diplomacy as a moderator between the two blocs (Schultz, 1992: 178). The ÖVP on the other hand was a more daring proponent of a creative interpretation of Austria’s neutrality, particularly by promoting closer relations with the EEC. The FPÖ’s position was exceptional: reflecting both its position of extremity along the right-left axis and its willingness to energise an anti-Proporz opposition, the party was the most daring of all in its approach to neutrality. Since during the Cold War entry into NATO was unthinkable, the FPÖ focused its strategy of reaction to Austrian democracy on the EEC issue and it became the biggest proponent of Austria’s accession to the Community (Luther, 2000: 430). In this way, the FPÖ translated into an otherwise ‘closed’ party system the demarcation dimension of the Cold War, while its support for EEC accession allowed it to use the internationalism of the Cold War as a way to make itself – and its opposition to the basic arrangements of the Proporz regime – look more respectable. This strategic calculation was adopted and expanded under the leadership of Jörg Haider after 1986. Until the end of the Cold War, the FPÖ’s combination of anti-regime populism, neoliberal economics and Cold War discourse was very similar to that of FN’s.
	Unlike France, where the Front National became increasingly protectionist and anti-Western after 1990-91, the FPÖ did not see in the end of the Cold War so much a reason for a reversal of its neoliberal profile as for its reinforcement. Already in 1989 a grand coalition government had decided that the on-going unravelling of the Cold War framework was allowing Austria to apply for EEC membership (Pelinka, 2004: 213), which eventually led to EU accession in 1995. Neutrality remained though the reference point for all foreign policy debates. The two main parties argued that an EEC/EU membership would allow Austria to defend its neutral status better because of the way EU membership would strengthen Austria’s capabilities in a new integrated world (Schultz, 1992: 191). 
	After the end of the Cold War, the FPÖ changed the content of its foreign policy reformism by reversing its support for EEC accession (which was now an elite mainstream project) (Pelinka, 2004: 213-215) but, most significantly, by becoming an unequivocal supporter of NATO accession (Meyer, 2007: 12; Virchow, 2007: 58-60). This choice may seem paradoxical, since one could expect Haider’s populism to turn against the US as the sole superpower (in analogy with the FPÖ’s Euroscepticism). It is also striking that the populist Haider insisted on a policy that went against the Austrian public’s strong affection to neutrality (Neuhold, 2003: 14). However, Haider’s goal of increasing polarisation within the party system under a modernised profile of the FPÖ was conditioned by a different geopolitical and domestic context than what other leaders of the far-right were functioning in. 
Making NATO the main foreign policy issue of domestic competition allowed Haider to achieve two interrelated goals: on the one hand, he was updating FPÖ’s anti-Proporz strategy by presenting the party as a real force of change (Luther, 2000: 437-439). On the other hand, he was infusing new elements in the hitherto centripetal right-left competition and was hoping to drive a wedge between the ÖVP and the SPÖ (Luther, 2000: 430; Pelinka, 2004: 217). Given that the ÖVP was always less fundamental about neutrality than the SPÖ, as well as that a new player, the Greens, had entered the fray to the left of the SPÖ with a strong neutrality agenda (Meyer, 2007: 13), Haider could hope that NATO would contribute to ending Proporz and making the FPÖ an indispensable partner of centre-right governments in a bipolar competition between two ideological camps (Müller and Fallend, 2004: 803). 
	Haider’s strategy seemed to be groomed with success after the controversial elections of 1999 and the even more controversial formation of an ÖVP-FPÖ government. A revaluation of foreign policy along Atlanticist lines was in the agenda of a government that had a program of neoliberal economic reforms and a strict policy of immigration (Müller, 2000: 193; Meyer, 2007: 10-11) – in other words, an anti-Proporz program of thorough reform of the Austrian state. The end of the Cold War had offered the opportunity to Haider to update the ideological message of the far-right without loosening its fundamental critique of the democratic regime of Austria. For a far-right party in extreme opposition to a democratic regime identified with neutrality, the victory of the West in the Cold War meant that an Atlanticist foreign policy made sense from the perspective of both the reaction and the modernisation imperatives. 
	The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition under Wolfgang Schüssel lasted from 2000 until 2006 but was tormented from the beginning by the FPÖ’s inability to conform to the exigencies and responsibilities of governmental office. Moreover, the party’s ultimate strategic goal was not achieved either. Despite extensive talk at the time about a polarisation of Austrian politics between Black-Blue (ÖVP-FPÖ) and Red-Green (SPÖ-Greens) camps (Müller and Fallend, 2004: 818), a complete realignment of the party system never came to pass. As the coalition negotiations after the 2002 elections showed, both the ÖVP and the SPÖ kept the option of re-establishing the grand coalition open. Indeed, a more accurate description would be that both big parties cultivated polarised competition between the two ‘camps’ mostly to increase each one’s leverage against the other in coalition negotiations (Luther, 2003: 143; Müller and Fallend, 2004: 822). Earlier, in 2001, the government’s report on Austria’s new defence doctrine failed to break completely with neutrality (Meyer, 2007: 6-9), thus reflecting the ÖVP’s reluctance towards initiatives that could galvanise further the unity of the red-green camp. 
	These developments, and the losses suffered in government, changed the FPÖ’s incentives and called for a return to populist opposition against the content and shape of the Austrian state. Having already seen how many tough decisions a neoliberal economic program entailed (by 2002 the FPÖ had shed most of its neoliberal positions) (Bornschier, 2011: 40), in 2002 Haider began a campaign to make the FPÖ again the party of principled opposition to the shape and values of the Austrian state and turned to spectacular foreign policy initiatives to make use of the new structural features of the international system (Müller and Fallend, 2004: 818-821). In 2002, in the midst of the war on terror, he famously made two visits to an embattled Saddam Hussein, thus breaking in spectacular fashion with the FPÖ’s prior Atlanticism (Luther, 2003: 140; Virchow, 2007: 68). These visits caused a severe crisis within the governing coalition and, more critically, within the FPÖ itself.​[2]​ By shedding Atlanticism, and discovering the US as the main threat to the international system, Haider sought to absorb the nation-state vs. globalisation opposition as a stake of domestic competition. Interestingly, while in the 1980s and 1990s the FPÖ’s feelings of unease with the Austrian state were expressed in calls for increase of its internationalisation, after the early 2000s the FPÖ became the chief enemy of these same processes of internationalisation! 
	Through four more tumultuous years in government and a series of internal splits, the FPÖ returned to opposition against a renewed ÖVP-SPÖ coalition in 2006. This reflected the re-emergence of a cultural axis pitting a populist, protectionist and much more working-class FPÖ against parties championing (in one form or other) the further internationalisation of the Austrian polity (Luther, 2008). Even though the mechanics of the Austrian party system reverted to the pre-2000 situation, the content and language of competition underpinning this structure was much different. The FPÖ energised an axis of cultural opposition that cut across the left-right, only this time the opposition to the Austrian state was not one of right-wing middle-class authoritarian neoliberalism but one of cultural protectionism (Kriesi et al, 2006: 940). Having failed to realign Austrian politics, the FPÖ redefined its reaction by absorbing the nation-state vs. globalisation line of conflict and has since presented itself as a fundamental opponent of the Austrian state’s withering economic and political sovereignty. 
	Changes of the coalition and opposition patterns of Austrian parties were powerful signals of an undergoing evolution in the logic of the Austrian party system. Unlike the FN in France, which used the end of the Cold War as a crucial resource to redefine French political space beyond the left-right schema and towards a protectionism vs. internationalism cultural cleavage, in the 1990s the FPÖ used the end of the Cold War as a way to increase adversity of the existing left-right dimension of competition. While the FPÖ followed a very comparable course from neoliberal far-right reaction to protectionist populism with the FN in France (Bornschier, 2011: 40-41), the different structures of the Austrian party system and the different position of Austria in the international geopolitical constellation created a different pathway of change than in France. The FPÖ eventually managed to reposition itself vis-à-vis on-going modernisation of the international system; because of this, the language structuring the Austrian party system evolved considerably.

Conclusion
This chapter has tried to account for the historical evolution of the far-right from its inception to the present day. It has argued that the far-right’s persistence cannot be understood outside a thick structure that constitutes but also provides far-right actors with resources to overcome their constant internal tension between the reaction and the modernisation imperatives. Despite some persistent original characteristics, the far-right’s outlook has varied as much as the institutional and normative structures it has been embedded in. In particular, the modern state has been both a target of attack and a source of renewal, codifying practices and norms that the far-right has engaged with in order to construct alternative reactionary visions of political rule. Interestingly the far-right has had to go ‘abroad’ in order to create solid foundations at home: It has had to translate lines of international conflict in a radicalised form in domestic politics in order to create conditions of extremity, and it has had to internalise norms that regulate international interaction in order to realign domestic politics in ways that the principle lines of conflict reflect its opposition to important expressions of the constantly modernising state. 
	The constructivist focus on embedded agency highlights the significance of international politics as constraining and enabling social structure embedding far-right actors, as well as conditioning the fluctuation in the appeal of different ideological traditions and political identities represented within far-right parties. In the economy, the far-right has corporatist and anti-capitalist origins, yet has endorsed hyper-liberal policies over significant periods of its existence. When it comes to the nation-state, the far-right is best known for its hyper-nationalism, yet this conflates its prior tradition of subversion of regimes with which it felt deeply uncomfortable and its upholding deeply ideological values even in the face of imminent national disaster. When it comes to democracy, the populism of the new radical right seems to have terminally reconciled the far-right with democratic procedures, to the extent that these parties present themselves as defenders of real democracy against faceless elites. However, its historical authoritarianism still informs its cultural predispositions. 
	A focus on the agency of the far-right also raises the issue of contingency and path dependence in the adaptation trajectories of different exponents of the far-right tradition. Here, domestic party system dynamics and international constellations create varying constraints and opportunities. As we saw, the Cold War pushed these parties to opt for a liberal economic profile and a defence of Western values against communism. With the end of the Cold War these parties gradually looked back at their collectivist and corporatist traditions to develop a populist and protectionist policy profile. These processes differed substantially from national arena to national arena. During the Cold War the FPÖ was constrained by Austria’s geopolitical position of neutrality, so it expressed its opposition to the Proporz state through strong support for EEC membership. In France, analogous feelings of hostility towards the Gaullist state led the FN to formulate strong pro-Western rhetoric. Yet while the end of the Cold War almost immediately triggered a turn of the FN away from pro-Western solidarity and towards protectionism, in Austria the FPÖ pursued a policy of NATO membership that only ebbed after a combination of domestic and international circumstances called for the party’s principled opposition to the Austrian polity to adapt to the rapid internationalisation of Austrian economy and policymaking.  
	The far-right’s interaction with the modern state does not take place only in the political field, but also in political economy. Indeed, this is a somewhat neglected aspect of the far-right’s outlook, yet it is of high importance if one accepts that the far-right’s evolution is essentially one of interaction with the capacities and normative attributes of the modern state. To the extent that states are embedded within larger economic constellations, the far-right’s constantly updated polarisation against the modern state implies also an engagement with these economic structures. Here, the record is somewhat surprising: Despite the far-right’s self-styled dissenting attitude, it has more often than not found itself on the side of powerful groups and classes that conveniently rode its radical fervour. As we saw, the far-right’s opposition to the democratic order of the French Third Republic and support to the Wilhelminian Reich both channelled nationalist and racist feelings created by European imperialism at the time; yet, they also served to magnify the influence of reactionary elites at home. The Nazi regime in Germany and Vichy in France fulfilled very little of their corporatist and populist promises (Weiss 1977). And the far-right’s neoliberalism of the 1980s was presented as an emancipatory policy against the rigidity of the welfare state, yet it also served interests in Western Europe’s political economy pushing for liberalisation of economic structures. 
	There seems to be then a pattern of the far-right consistently opting for a support of as much unfettered capitalist development as possible, even if that meant giving up on policy promises that had attracted less well-off strata (on the far-right’s supposed anti-capitalism and a refined analysis of what is essentially an opposition to big finance capitalism, see Saull (2013) and in this volume). This pattern may be explained with reference to our conceptualisation of the far-right as rooted in a tradition that predisposes it towards opposition to the constant modernisation of capabilities, shape and norms of the state. Karl Polanyi (1944) had showed that much of the resistance to the ‘great transformation’ brought about by ‘socially disembedded’ markets was coming from forces functioning in the confines and through the modern state, seeking to re-embed a transnational capitalist market. He also saw fascism as a force that resolved the crisis between the transnational market and nationally based efforts to produce social content in favour of the former. The neoliberalism of the far-right in the 1980s can be seen as an extension of this, as it was favouring the unfettered market against the socially (and nationally) embedded liberalism constructed after World War II. 
	This is in line with our own conceptualisation of the far-right as a force selectively opposing evolving modernisation of the shape of the state, in conjunction with the opportunities provided by the structure of international politics to overcome the contrasting reaction and modernisation imperatives. As for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the tendency had been for the state to increase its prerogatives and capacity to embed the capitalist economy, the far-right’s opposition to the state’s evolution was reflected in opposition to real effective institutions curbing the power of the market. Under the conditions of the Cold War, this meant that the far-right for the first time espoused liberal economics outspokenly. But even when it nominally held protectionist feelings and corporatist policies, the reaction imperative compelled the far-right to oppose advancing modernity even if it had to renege on promises to reinstate pre-capitalist protectionist structures once it assumed power (as in Vichy France or Nazi Germany). 
In this sense, the last 20 years may have foreshadowed an interesting shift in the far-right’s focus and relationship with capitalist development. Because this is the period when advancing modernity dictates a retrenchment of the state’s ability to (in Polanyi’s terms) socially embed international markets, and because the reaction imperative dictates that the far-right oppose modernisation of at least some norms and practices as it takes place, the far-right has increasingly assumed the mantle of the only major political force in West European party systems with an agenda of curtailing and embedding of markets – of supporting a ‘countermovement’ (in Polanyi’s terminology) against unchecked European and international economic integration. If the modern, territorially demarcated state remains the main instrument for mitigating negative externalities of the functioning of the transnational European market, it is little surprise that the far-right, with an agenda of opposition to the postmodern ‘internationalised’ state, has arisen as the most credible representative of those who crave for more social protection (Höpner and Schäfer, 2012). 
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